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Abstract:  
 
The phenomenon of globalization and the expansion of EU mobility rights have been a catalyst for 
cross-border crime and a driving force for Member State cooperation in the field of criminal law. 
This paper argues broadly that EU mechanisms which facilitate Member State cooperation in 
criminal investigations and prosecutions have problematic consequences for EU citizens and the 
functioning of the EU as an independent legal order. A comprehensive approach to criminal justice 
that balances the need to cooperate in combating crime and the need to respect the defence rights of 
suspects is necessary. In particular, for EU defence rights to be practical and effective, EU law must 
buttress the right of access to legal counsel and legal aid.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine you are a citizen of the European Union (the ‘EU’) who travels to France, a 
neighbouring Member State, to participate in a peaceful protest against global warming. 
While exercising your EU-wide rights to freedom of movement1, expression2 and assembly3 
a riot breaks out. Despite your peaceful demeanour, the police arrest you, along with 
everyone else who appears to be a protester. Communicating with the police is a challenge 
because you do not speak French. You are unable to obtain information on the charges 
against you or on how long you will be in police custody. The police ask you questions 
without providing you with an interpretation or an opportunity to contact a lawyer. What 
are your options? Can you expect to enjoy the same defence rights that apply upon arrest in 
your country of nationality or residence? Do you have a right to be informed of the reasons 
for your detention in a language you understand? Do you have a right to legal counsel 
before participating in police interrogations? Do you have a right to free legal assistance if 
you cannot afford a lawyer?  
 
Laws recently implemented by the EU address only some of these questions. The 
phenomenon of globalization and the expansion of EU mobility rights have been a catalyst 
for cross-border crime and a driving force for Member State cooperation in the field of 
criminal law. In the past decade, legislative developments in the EU have established 
several mechanisms that facilitate Member State cooperation with a view to enhancing 
security through the prevention and combating of cross-border crime. Such mechanisms 
also aim to enhance accountability within the EU by preventing persons with criminal 
charges or convictions, in a particular Member State, to escape justice by fleeing to another 
Member State. Member States acknowledge that defence rights are foundational to the 
development of the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice; however, the legal 
framework for defence rights at the EU level remains inadequate.  
 
This paper argues broadly that EU mechanisms currently available to facilitate Member 
State cooperation in criminal investigations and prosecutions have problematic 
consequences for EU citizens and the functioning of the EU as an independent legal order. 
A comprehensive approach to criminal justice that balances the need to cooperate in 
combating crime and the need to respect fundamental rights is necessary. In particular, for 
EU rights to be practical and effective, the EU must buttress the right of access to legal 
counsel and legal aid. Defence rights, in the context of this paper, refer to rights that are 
necessary for criminal processes to be fair and just. This includes the right to a fair trial, the 
right against self-incrimination, the right to be informed of the reasons of arrest or 
detention, the right to remain silent and the right of access to legal counsel. Criminal 
proceedings refer broadly to all stages of the criminal justice process, including early pre-
trial investigations by police. 
 
2. GLOBALIZATION AND MOBILITY: FUEL FOR CROSS-BORDER CRIME 
 
Globalization is a phenomenon that is generally understood as the ‘growing 
interconnectedness of the nations of the world’.4 An example of globalization is the ever-
increasing openness in trade and movement of people, goods, services, and communication 
                                                 
1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/389 (EU Charter), art 45. 
2 ibid, art 11.  
3 ibid, art 12.  
4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime 
Threat Assessment’ (United Nations 2010) 29, <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf> accessed 21 December 2013.  
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since the end of the Cold War. By-products of this openness and mobility include 
opportunities for serious cross-border crime and the international mobility of criminals.5 
The intensity of contemporary migrant flows makes it difficult for Member State authorities 
to identify irregular migrants and the perpetrators of serious organized criminality, such as 
human trafficking, at external EU border controls.6 Since the development of ‘wide-body 
jumbo jets’ and airline deregulation in the 1970s, the number of air passengers worldwide 
has risen at a rate of approximately 5% per year and airfares have significantly decreased.7 
This increase in the capacity and accessibility of air travel, in conjunction with EU policies 
that break down internal barriers to the movement of people, has contributed to a rise in 
organized criminal activity, such as human trafficking.8  Traffickers transport victims from 
their country of origin directly to destination countries using low cost airlines.9 The 
abolition of checks at internal borders in the EU with the Schengen acquis reduces the 
chance of detecting such criminal activity.10  
 
Member States recognize human trafficking is a serious issue.11 EU citizens who fall victim 
to human trafficking suffer grave human rights abuses. Human trafficking also poses serious 
security threats to Member States and the EU through links to organized crime, drug 
trafficking, corruption and terrorism. Specifically, criminal groups use the proceeds of 
human trafficking to fund and recruit people to engage in other criminal activities, such as 
terrorism.12 The United Nations estimates that human trafficking generates ‘tens of billions 
of dollars in profits for criminals each year’.13  
 
Like air travel, transport by sea has rapidly expanded in recent years in ways that facilitate 
serious organized criminality. According to the UNODC, between 1996 and 2007, the 
volume of goods transported worldwide increased from roughly ‘332 million tons to 828 
million tons’.14 This sharp increase in trade facilitates the flow of illicit drugs and sub-
standard counterfeit goods.15 ‘Violence, public health issues, a high number of deaths and 
feelings of insecurity are all linked to the trade in drugs’16 and counterfeit goods pose health 
and safety risks for consumers.17  
 
Communications technology has also rapidly developed, creating novel opportunities for 
cross-border crime. Notably, the Internet provides a global marketplace for illicit activities 
while allowing unprecedented anonymity. This has revolutionized traditional crimes such as 
                                                 
5 EUROPOL, ‘EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2013’ (European Police Office 
2013) <https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/socta2013.pdf> accessed 21 
December 2013.  
6 UNODC, ‘The Globalization of Crime’ (n 4) 29. 
7 ibid 30. 
8 EUROPOL, ‘EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment’ (n 5) 16. 
9 EUROPOL, ‘Knowledge Product: Trafficking in Human Beings in the European Union’ (European Police 
Office 2011) 7.  
10 EUROPOL, ‘EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment’ (n 5) 16. 
11 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA [2011] OJ L101/1 (HT Directive). 
12 EUROPOL, ‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’ (European Police Office 2013) 11, 18 and 29 
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europol_te-sat2013_lr_0.pdf> accessed 21 
December 2013.  
13‘Human Trafficking FAQs’ (UNODC, 2013) <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-
trafficking/faqs.html> accessed 21 December 2013.  
14 UNODC, ‘The Globalization of Crime’ (n 4) 30. 
15 EUROPOL, ‘EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment’ (n 5) 22. 
16 ibid 19. 
17 ibid 22. 
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child pornography and sexual exploitation.18 Through the Internet, criminals are able to 
target victims remotely, anywhere in the world, and obscure offences by concealing their 
real identity and important personal characteristics, such as age.19 
 
3. CROSS-BORDER CONSENSUS: TRANSNATIONAL CRIME NECESSITATES A 
TRANSNATIONAL RESPONSE 
 
The phenomenon of globalization and the implementation of EU mobility rights have 
intensified security concerns and fuelled Member State cooperation in criminal law.20 This 
is evident in a series of EU communications, action plans and legislative developments that 
articulate a commitment to strengthening the EU as an area of justice, freedom and security 
– that is, an area in which the free movement of persons is ‘assured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures relating to the prevention and combating of crime’.21 With a view to 
militating against the deleterious effects of mobility rights already in place to facilitate the 
development of the EU as an economic union, the Maastricht Treaty brought aspects of 
criminal law within the ambit of EU power.22 The Treaty of Amsterdam explicitly 
established the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice.23  
 
The Tampere Conclusions illuminate that a fundamental purpose of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam was to ensure that EU citizens could enjoy the right to move freely within the 
EU in conditions of security and justice:  
 
The enjoyment of freedom requires a genuine area of justice, where people can approach 
courts and authorities in any Member State as easily as in their own. Criminals must find no 
ways of exploiting differences in the judicial systems of Member States. Judgments and 
decisions should be respected and enforced throughout the [EU], while safeguarding the 
basic legal certainty of people and economic operators. Better compatibility and more 
convergence between the legal systems of Member States must be achieved.24 
 
With a view to achieving the objective of developing the EU as an area of freedom, security 
and justice,25 the Tampere Conclusions called on EU institutions and Member States to 
‘reinforce the fight against serious organized and transnational crime’26 and to step up co-
operation between Member States when investigating,27 prosecuting28 and defining crime.29 
                                                 
18 UNODC, ‘The Globalization of Crime’ (n 4) 31. 
19 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating 
the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2004/68/JHA [2011] OJ L 335/1 (Directive on sexual abuse and exploitation of children), preamble 
recitals 3 and 19. See also EUROPOL, ‘EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment’ (n 5) 7, 15 – 16.  
20 Valentina Bazzocchi, ‘The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ in Giacomo Di Federico (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights From Declaration to Binding 
Instrument (Springer 2011) 191; See also Sandra Lavenex and William Wallace, ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, in 
Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark Pollack (eds), Policy Making in the European Union (OUP 2005) 
460-461. 
21 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty of the European Union [2002] OJ C325 (TEU), art 2; Council 
Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council 15-16 October 1999 [1999] (Tampere Conclusions); 
Council The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union 13 
December 2004 [2004] OJ C53/1 (Hague Programme); Council The Stockholm Programme — An open and 
secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, 4 May 2010 [2010] OJ C115/01 (Stockholm Programme).  
22 Treaty of the European Union [1993] OJ C191 (Maastricht Treaty), art K.1.(7) and (9).  
23 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts [1997] OJ C340/1 (Treaty of Amsterdam). 
24 Tampere Conclusions (n 21) para 5.  
25 ibid introduction.  
26 ibid paras 40 – 50. 
27 ibid paras 43 – 45, 49. 
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In response to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. on 11th September 
2001, and in Madrid on 11th March 2004, the Hague Programme reaffirmed the need to 
deepen police and judicial cooperation in order to address emerging security challenges, 
such as the threat of terrorism.30 A few years later, in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty radically 
restructured the architecture of the EU in a way that brought criminal law under full EU 
control.31 Specifically, the Lisbon Treaty made criminal law an area of shared competence 
between Member States and the EU.32 As such, to the extent that the EU exercises its 
competence in a particular area of criminal law Member States will lose competence.33 The 
Lisbon Treaty also repealed Article 34 of the TEU, which previously blocked the 
application of direct effect to Framework Decisions on police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters.34 Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty explicitly gave the EU competence to 
establish common rules of criminal procedure through the implementation of directives.35 
Accordingly, under the contemporary legal framework, the EU has clear power to act in 
relation to criminal law and procedure. Any EU law that relates to criminal law or 
procedure and satisfies the conditions for direct effect will be immediately binding on 
Member States, without further formality, and be available for individuals to invoke in 
national courts. 36   
 
4. A PREDOMINATELY PROSECUTORIAL AGENDA 
 
While a general intention to balance the need to safeguard security with the need to respect 
fundamental rights appears in all EU communications, action plans and legislative 
developments that relate to criminal law, the operation of the EU criminal justice 
mechanisms reveal a focus on security and a predominately prosecutorial agenda. The 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States (the ‘EAW Framework Decision’) provides 
the strongest example.37 The EAW Framework Decision replaced the extradition system 
with the objective of increasing efficiency in conducting criminal prosecutions and 
executing custodial sentences and detention orders.38 The EAW Framework Decision 
explicitly affirms the need to ensure respect for defence rights,39 yet it removed protective 
barriers built into the former extradition system with a view to introducing ‘speed and a 
considerable element of automaticity’. 40 A report by the Commission illuminates several 
shortcomings of the EAW system with respect to fundamental rights, including:  
                                                                                                                                                       
28 ibid paras 46, 49.  
29 ibid para 48.  
30 Hague Programme (n 21). 
31 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C306/01 (Lisbon Treaty). 
32 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version 2012) OJ C 326/01 (TFEU), art 
4(2)(j).  
33 ibid art 2(2).  
34 Treaty of Amsterdam (n 23), art 34.  
35 TFEU (n 32), art 82(2).  
36 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] ECR 1. 
37 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ  L190/1 (EAW Framework Decision), Council 
Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, 
2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909 JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights 
of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decision rendered in the 
absence of the person concerned at the trial [2009] OJ L81/24. 
38 ibid EAW Framework Decision, art 1(1).   
39 ibid EAW Framework Decision, art 1(3).  
40 Debbie Sayers, ‘The European Investigation Order: Travelling without a ‘roadmap’’ (2011) Centre for 
 VOLUME 6 EJLS    ISSUE 2 
 
 142 
 
[N]o entitlement to legal representation in the issuing state during the surrender 
proceedings in the executing state; detention conditions in some Member States combined 
with sometimes lengthy pre-trial detention for surrendered persons and the non-uniform 
application of a proportionality check by issuing states, resulting in requests for surrender 
for relatively minor offences that, in the absence of a proportionality check in the executing 
state, must be executed.41 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘CJEU’) has upheld the legality of the 
EAW Framework Decision and confirmed that Member States are obliged to act on an 
EAW,42 yet its transposition into the national law of Member States remains controversial 
with respect to fundamental rights.43  
 
In addition to the EAW, a series of legislative developments facilitate Member State 
cooperation with respect to storing and gathering of data, information, intelligence and 
evidence for criminal investigations.44 To further simplify, integrate and expand Member 
State cooperation in obtaining evidence for criminal cases with cross-border dimensions, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
European Policy Studies, 3 <http://www.ceps.be/book/european-investigation-order-travelling-without-
‘roadmap’> accessed 17 December 2013; see also, EAW Framework Decision (n 37), Preamble paras (1) and 
(5).  See Also Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States’ COM (2011) 175 final, 3: Prior to the 
introduction of the EAW system, the average surrender time of requested persons was on average one-year. 
Under the EAW system, between 2005 and 2009, the average surrender time of a requested person who 
consented to their surrender was 14 – 17 days and the average surrender time for those who did not consent 
was 48 days. Arguably, this efficiency suggests the EAW is an operational success. However, efficiency must 
not come at the expense of respect for the fundamental rights of EU citizens. 
41 ibid 6.  
42 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Werelld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-3633, paras 52-53.  
43 Craig and de Burca (n 36) 950. 
44 See Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European Union 
of orders freezing property or evidence [2003] OJ L196/45 (Framework Decision on Freezing of Property). 
To prevent the destruction, transformation, moving, transfer or disposal of evidence, this framework decision 
establishes rules to facilitate, and in certain cases mandate, Member State cooperation in the recognition and 
execution of freezing orders in its territory issued by a judicial authority of another Member State. See also , 
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L105/54 
(Directive on data retention):  As a reaction to the acts of terrorisms in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, 
this Directive mandates blanket retention of non-content traffic and location communications data for six 
months to two years - to ensure that the data is available for the purpose of the investigation, detention and 
prosecution of serious crime.  See also, Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on 
simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member 
States of the European Union [2006] OJ L386/89: This decision establishes rules to facilitate and in certain 
circumstances mandate the exchange of ‘existing information and intelligence effectively and expeditiously for 
the purpose of conducting criminal investigations or criminal intelligence operations’. Interestingly, a 
proportionality check is built into the article to ensure only information and intelligence deemed ‘relevant and 
necessary’ must be provided. Refer also to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping 
up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime [2008] OJ 
L210/1: This decision (the Prüm Decision) requires Member States to establish national DNA analysis files 
and fingerprint identification systems for the purpose of criminal investigations. See also, Framework Decision 
2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European Evidence Warrant for the Purpose of Obtaining 
Objects, Documents and Data for Use in Proceedings in Criminal Matters [2008] OJ L350/72: This decision 
provides a tool for Member States to obtain objects, documents and data for use in certain criminal 
proceedings. 
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European Parliament and the Council have proposed the implementation of a European 
Investigation Order (the ‘EIO’).45 The EIO would  
 
replace all the existing instruments in this area, including the Framework Decision on the 
European evidence warrant, covering as far as possible all types of evidence and containing 
deadlines for enforcement and limiting as far as possible the grounds for refusal46  
 
without adequate contemplation of ramifications for defence rights.  
 
The EIO is clearly a prosecution mechanism that prioritizes the need for efficiency in 
criminal processes over the need to promote defence rights.47 While the EIO may effectively 
addresses the need for Member State authorities to access relevant evidence in a timely way, 
it ‘provides no competence for the defence to apply for evidence’.48 Further police 
cooperation in criminal investigations can occur under the EIO without the knowledge of 
the suspect and largely in the absence of judicial oversight or control.49 Furthermore, many 
specific protections necessary to ensure the fairness of criminal proceedings are missing, 
such as guarantees that witnesses and suspects receive access to legal advice and that 
interviews are tape-recorded.50   
 
The need for EU-wide ‘minimum standards’ of procedural law to enhance defence rights has 
been anticipated since the Tampere Conclusions in 1999,51 yet EU legislative developments 
fail to provide effective and practical defence rights. In 2000, the Commission recommended 
the adoption of ‘conterminously protective measures’ to balance cooperation in criminal 
processes, including ‘mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of [...] suspects’ and ‘the 
definition of common minimum standards necessary to facilitate the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition’.52 Despite such recommendations, the legislative agenda 
thus far has developed largely without the establishment of minimum standards or 
protective measures. While the recent implementation of directives that affirm the right to 
interpretation and translation and the right to information in criminal proceedings 
represent crucial first steps, more comprehensive measures are necessary. In particular, 
common minimum standards with respect to the right to legal advice and legal aid are 
essential to the development of the EU is an area of freedom, justice and security.  
 
5. MUTUAL RECOGNITION: THE CORNERSTONE OF COOPERATION 
 
As a result of difficulty in reaching political consensus on common rules of criminal law, the 
principle of mutual recognition is the cornerstone of police and judicial cooperation between 
Member States. Mutual recognition provides a procedural tool for Member State 
cooperation without requiring Member States to harmonize their substantive law.53 For 
                                                 
45 Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, the Kingdom of 
Spain, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Slovenia and the Kingdom of Sweden for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal, [2010] OJ 
C165/22. 
46 ibid preamble and para 6. 
47 ibid preamble and paras 11-13. 
48 Sayers (n 40) 8. 
49 ibid.  
50 ibid 16.  
51 Tampere Conclusions (n 21) para 37.  
52 European Commission Programme of Measures to Implement the Principle of Mutual Recognition of 
Decisions in Criminal Matters [2001] OJ C12/10, 10, parameters 3 and 4. 
53 Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Law Matters in 
the European Union’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1277, 1279.  
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example, the EAW system requires Member States to recognize and execute arrest 
warrants issued by other Member States without establishing common definitions for 
criminal offences.54 The EAW operates according to definitions set out in the law of the 
issuing Member State.55 Similarly, the Directive on data retention establishes EU-wide 
obligations to retain certain traffic and location communications data for the purpose of the 
investigation, detention and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by Member States in 
national law.56 Member States also retain the power to define the procedures and conditions 
for gaining access to retained data.57 More recent directives reflect an effort to establish 
common definitions and penalties for certain serious crimes – human trafficking and sexual 
abuse of children - which are particularly sensational, pose security threats and cause 
egregious harm and necessitate unique protections for victims.58  
 
Despite a trend towards deeper cooperation in the area of criminal law, Member States 
remain hesitant to harmonize rules of criminal procedure as a result of a fear that 
harmonization will bulldoze important differences between the adversarial and inquisitorial 
criminal justice traditions.59 Under the adversarial model, criminal proceedings are ‘built 
around a contest between parties’ during which defence lawyers play an active role in 
ensuring protection for suspects’ rights. 60 Conversely, in the inquisitorial model, criminal 
proceedings are built around an active investigation by State authorities whereby a 
particular judicial authority supervises the treatment of suspects and defence lawyers play a 
subordinate role.61  Member States with inquisitorial traditions view recommendations to 
implement common rules of criminal procedure as an imposition of the adversarial tradition 
across Europe.62 This view stems from a controversial assumption that adversarial and 
inquisitorial traditions represent irreconcilable approaches to criminal justice.  
 
An alternative view posits that legal traditions are evolving and overlapping entities that 
continually rub against each other and borrow values, beliefs and practices:63  
 
Rather than classifying contemporary jurisdictions in Continental Europe as being 
inquisitorial in attitudes and practices, it would be more accurate to say that they have been 
primarily ‘shaped by’ the ‘inquisitorial tradition’ […] Contemporary practice is ‘mixed’ or 
‘moderately inquisitorial’.64 
 
According to this view, legal traditions are best understood as sites of ‘ideological conflict’ 
that are ‘invented and reinvented through debate and dialogue.’65 The fluidity of 
information across jurisdictional borders in Europe makes limiting and controlling debate 
between and within legal traditions impossible. Arguably, the ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ 
                                                 
54 ibid 1283. 
55 EAW Framework decision, arts 2(1) and (2).  
56 Directive on data retention, art 1.  
57 ibid, art 4.  
58 HT Directive; Directive on Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Children.  
59 Steward Field, ‘Fair Trials and Procedural Tradition in Europe’ [2009] 29:2 OJLS 365, 368.  
60 ibid. 
61 ibid 368.  
62 Jacqueline Hodgson, ‘EU Criminal Justice: The Challenge of Due Process Rights within a Framework of 
Mutual Recognition’ (2012) 37 NCJ Intl L & COM Reg 307, 309. 
63 Patrick Glenn, ‘Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions’ in Mathias Reimann and 
Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2008).  
64 Field (n 59) 371.  
65 ibid 370. 
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binary is ‘vague’ and ‘inconsequent’ because jurisdictions combine features of both 
traditions.66  
 
Whether defence rights are unique to adversarial systems or a component of a system of 
universal rights that transcends all models of criminal justice remains a contentious issue.67 
A series of cases illustrate that the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECtHR’) has 
adopted a view that a common set of defence rights emerge out of the constitutional 
traditions of the Council of Europe Member States.68 Although Member States generally 
agree procedural fairness concepts, such as equality of arms and judicial impartiality, apply 
during the trial stage of criminal proceedings,69 Member States dispute the importance and 
scope of the right to legal counsel in the early pre-trial investigation stages of criminal 
proceedings.70 At the heart of this dispute is divergence in understandings of the role of the 
defence lawyer, prosecutor, and judge. In Member States with broadly adversarial systems, 
such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, the prosecution and defence 
lawyers are responsible for conducting investigations and presenting evidence to argue 
their case. Police interrogations may be tape-recorded and defence lawyers may be present, 
however, police officers are not typically subject to external supervision.71 In the absence of 
external supervision, the right to legal counsel provides a counter balance to the power 
inherently held by the State, which puts the defence at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
prosecution. Conversely, in Member States with broadly inquisitorial systems, such as 
France, Belgium, Greece, Germany and the Netherlands, defence lawyers play a subordinate 
and passive role during investigations as judges play an active role.72 Judicial authorities 
have overall responsibility for the investigation of both incriminating and exculpatory 
evidence. Arguably, this authority provides external supervision of police and protects the 
fundamental rights of suspects; therefore, the right to legal counsel is not essential to 
ensure a fair trial.73 Judicial authority provides an alternative means to ensure that police 
did not use coercive tactics to obtain confessions.74 
 
6. DEFENCE RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL TO THE EU LEGAL ORDER 
 
Contemporary EU laws that facilitate Member State cooperation in the investigation and 
prosecution of cross border crimes rest on a problematic assumption that all Member States 
act in compliance with the defence rights set out in the Charter and the ECHR. Throughout 
this section, it is important to keep in mind that the CJEU hears complaints of violations of 
EU law and its decisions bind Member States of the EU. The ECtHR hears petitions that 
allege violations of the ECHR and its decisions apply to the Member States of the Council 
of Europe but are not directly binding under EU law. The ECHR is not a legal instrument 
formally incorporated into EU law.75 The CJEU recently affirmed that EU law ‘does not 
govern the relations between the ECHR and the legal systems of the Member States, nor 
does it determine conclusions to be drawn by a national court’ where the ECHR is in 
                                                 
66 Sarah Summers, Fair trials: the European Criminal Procedural Tradition and the European Court of Human 
Rights (Hart Publishing 2007), 5.  
67 Hodgson (n 62) 311. 
68 Field (n 59) 368.  See also description of cases below.  
69 ibid, 372 – 373. 
70 Jacqueline Hodgson, ‘Safeguarding Suspects’ Rights in Europe: A Comparative Perspective’ (2011) 14 New 
Crim L Rev 611, 638. 
71 ibid 636. 
72 ibid 637. 
73 ibid 637. 
74 ibid 638. 
75 Case C-617/10, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, [2013] (not yet reported) (Akerberg) para 44. 
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conflict with a rule of national law.76 Nonetheless, the ECHR influences EU law77 and CJEU 
competence to apply the ECHR, directly as EU law, is on the horizon.78  
 
The Charter explicitly sets out defence rights, which are binding on Member States when 
they are implementing EU law. Article 47 provides a ‘right to an effective remedy and to a 
fair trial’.79 A fair trial requires a public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal previously established by law with the ‘possibility of being advised, 
defended and represented’.80 Article 47 goes on to specify ‘legal aid shall be made available 
to those who lack sufficient resources’ where such aid is ‘necessary to ensure effective access 
to justice’.81 Article 48 guarantees respect for ‘the rights of the defence’ of all persons 
charged with a criminal offence.82  Article 51 limits the scope of application of the Charter 
to Member States ‘when they are implementing EU law’. 83  
 
The implications of this limitation and the situations in which the Charter applies to 
‘Member States’ (in)actions’ in the context of defence rights is unclear. Citing a series of 
CJEU case law, the Explanations on Article 51 of the Charter set out an expansive 
definition of the ‘requirement to respect fundamental rights’ as being ‘binding on Member 
States when they act in the scope of Union law’.84 The CJEU recently gave teeth to this 
expansive definition in the case of Akerberg.85 However, Akerberg concerns the prohibition of 
double jeopardy – that is, punishing persons who have already been punished for the same 
act through different proceedings86 - in the context of tax offences.87 The extent to which 
the conclusions and the approach of the CJEU in Akerberg are generalizable and applicable 
in the context of defence rights set out under Article 47 and 48 of the Charter is not crystal-
clear. A narrow reading of Akerberg, which limits its application to its specific facts, is 
possible.88 On such a reading, the CJEU has ‘plenty of room’ to adopt a more restrictive 
approach when it irons out the meaning of ‘implementing EU law’ in future cases.89 
Consequently, the implementation of directives under Article 82(2) of the TFEU that 
explicitly require Member States to implement defence rights under EU law is necessary to 
ensure the effective and practical enforcement of Article 47 and 48 of the Charter.90  
 
                                                 
76 ibid. See also Case C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v Instituto per L’Edilizia Sociale della Provincia Autonoma di 
Bolzano, Giunta della Provincia Autonoma di Boizano, Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano [2012] ECR I-0000, para 
62. 
77 TEU, art 6: The ECHR is a source of inspiration for the general principles of EU law; see EU Charter, art 
52(3): ‘The CJEU must give provisions of the Charter modeled on provisions of the ECHR similar meaning’.  
78 TEU art 6(2): ‘The Lisbon Treaty mandates EU accession to the ECHR’.  
79 EU Charter, art 47. 
80 ibid art 47. 
81 ibid art 47. 
82 ibid art 48. 
83 ibid art 51(1).  
84 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/32 (Explanations) Article 51.  
85 Akerberg (n 75) para 19-22. See also John Morihn, ‘Akerberg and Melloni: what the ECJ said, did and may 
have left open’ (Eutopia Law, 14 March 2013) <http://eutopialaw.com/2013/03/14/akerberg-and-melloni-
what-the-ecj-said-did-and-may-have-left/> accessed 17 December 2013.  
86 The prohibition of double jeopardy falls under EU Charter, art 4.  
87 Akerberg (n 75) para 14.  
88 Morihn (n 85). 
89 ibid. 
90 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a 
Directive on the European Parliament and of the Council on the Right of Access to a Lawyer and of 
Notification of Custody to a Third Person in Criminal Proceedings’ [2011] SEC(2011) 687, 18 (Impact 
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Moreover, the extent to which the CJEU has jurisdiction to rule on and enforce minimum 
standards of criminal procedure remains unclear.91 Article 276 of the TFEU carves out an 
explicit limitation on CJEU jurisdiction with respect to oversight of police operations:  
 
In exercising its powers regarding the provisions of Chapters 4 [Judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters] and 5 [Police cooperation] of Title V of Part Three relating to the area of 
freedom, security and justice, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no 
jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police 
or other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities 
incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security. 92    
 
The implementation of EU rules of criminal procedure under the rubric of Article 82(2) of 
the TFEU may indirectly or progressively permit the CJEU to play a role in safeguarding 
defence rights across Europe.93  
 
The ECtHR has jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of acts by police and 
other law-enforcement services when considering allegations that relate to defence rights, 
however, the enforcement mechanisms of the ECtHR are notoriously weak. The number of 
ECtHR orders not fully respected by Member States after more than five years grew by 
approximately 28% between 2010 and 2011. 94 The number of repetitive cases95 and repeat 
violations96 is also alarming and indicative of the systemic weakness of ECHR enforcement.   
 
The enforcement mechanisms of the CJEU are stronger than those of the ECtHR. The 
Commission has authority to bring claims against Member States before the CJEU for 
failure to fulfill obligations under EU law, including any directives on defence rights. A 
finding that the laws of a particular Member State are in breach of EU law will require that 
Member State to bring its laws into compliance and the CJEU may impose financial 
penalties for failure to do so.97 No similar mechanism exists to ensure compliance with the 
decisions of the ECtHR.  
 
Moreover, the ECtHR is currently facing major challenges in managing its caseload. Long 
delays in delivering judgments - a result of the inability of the ECtHR to manage its ‘ever-
increasing wave of applications’ - negatively affects the legitimacy of the Court.98 The 
number of cases pending before the ECtHR in 2011 was 10,689, which represents an 
increase of roughly 8% compared to 2010.99 While the CJEU has a special procedure to hear 
complaints on an urgent basis where the applicant is in custody, the ECtHR has no similar 
procedure. 100 
 
                                                 
91 Ed Cape, Zaza Namoradze, Roger Smith and Taru Spronken, ‘Effective Criminal Defence in Europe’ 
(Intersentia 2010) 12.  
92 TFEU, art 276.  
93 Hodgson (n 70) 614.  
94 Council of Europe, ‘Execution of Strasbourg Court Judgments: Considerable Progress but Concern about 
Major Structural Problems’ Press Release DC042 (2012).  
95 Council of Europe, ‘Supervision of the Execution of Judgment and Decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ Annual Report 2011 (2012), 34 (Council of Europe Annual Report 2011).  
96 Ed Cape (n 91) 12.  
97 TFEU, art 260. See also Sonja Boelaert, ‘European Union Courts’ in Chiara Giorgetti (ed), The rules, practice, 
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An Impact Assessment by the European Commission explicitly raises the concern that the 
ECHR fails to guarantee adequate protection of defence rights: 
 
Abstractly, one could assume that the existence of an ECtHR body of case-law which 
interprets the ECHR provisions may lead to progressive acceptance of those common 
standards by all Member States. However, reliance on decisions of the ECtHR (even when 
they constitute settled case-law, which may take years) at best promotes piecemeal and ad 
hoc pressure to reform national practice rather than a comprehensive and consistent 
development of EU-wide procedures to ensure compliance with fair trial rights.101 
 
Defence rights are set out in Article 5 and 6 of the ECHR. 102 Article 5 guarantees the right 
to liberty and security of person and prohibits unlawful detention and arrest.103 Article 6 of 
the ECHR provides minimum rights for anyone charged with a criminal offence, which 
includes: the right to be informed promptly, in a language he or she understands and in 
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her; to have adequate time 
and facilities to prepare his or her defence; to defend oneself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, 
to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.104  
 
ECtHR jurisprudence significantly expands the rights guaranteed under Article 6 of the 
ECHR. For example, in 2008 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR issued a ground breaking 
decision in the case of Salduz v. Turkey, which set a strong precedent that establishes the 
right to legal representation applies during pre-trial investigations.105 The Court 
recognized the vulnerability of suspects to ‘abusive coercion’ during the investigation stage 
of criminal proceedings.106 The Court went on to find that this vulnerability threatens the 
fundamental right of suspects to a fair trial and ‘can only be properly compensated for by 
the assistance of a lawyer’.107 When a European State fails to provide access to a lawyer at 
this early stage, the defence rights of the accused of suspect are ‘irretrievably prejudiced’108 
and the State may be found in violation of the ECHR, unless ‘compelling reasons’ justify the 
restriction on access to a lawyer.109  
 
The case law of the ECtHR highlights significant variance in the extent to which Member 
States comply with defence rights and diversity in the ways that Member States achieve 
compliance.110 In determining violations of Article 6 of the ECHR, the ECtHR accepts a 
‘margin of appreciation’ - space to manoeuvre in structuring their justice systems - in order 
to respect the divergent legal traditions of Member States.111 On several occasions, the 
ECtHR has observed that the positive obligations in Article 6 of the ECHR give Member 
States wide discretion with respect to the choice of the means to ensure respect for defence 
                                                 
101 Impact assessment (n 90) 19. 
102 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 
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109 ibid para 55. 
110 For several examples see Dovydas Vitkauskas and Sîan Lewis-Anthony, ‘Right to a Fair Trial under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Article 6)’ (Interights, 2009) 
<http://www.interights.org/document/106/index.html> accessed 17 December 2013.   
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rights.112 For example, in the context of the right to legal aid, the case of Quaranta v. 
Switzerland explicitly reiterates that Member States ‘enjoy considerable freedom in the 
choice of the means of ensuring that their legal system satisfies the requirements of Article 
6.’113 The task of the ECtHR is ‘to determine whether the method chosen by them in this 
connection leads to results which, in the cases which come before it, are consistent with the 
requirements of the ECHR’.114  
 
This variance in compliance with defence rights among Member States highlights the need 
to establish uniform minimum standards of criminal procedure to ensure practical and 
effective protection for the defence rights of EU citizens.115 The operation of the EAW 
directly exposes EU citizens to unfamiliar criminal processes:  
 
By recognizing and executing a decision by another Member State, the guarantees of the 
criminal law of the executing Member State are challenged, as the limits of the criminal law 
become uncertain. This may lead to the worsening of the position of the individual… 
compromising well-established constitutional protection in the executing of State and thus 
challenge the relationship between the individual and the States created on the basis of 
citizenship and territoriality.116 
 
Moreover, amalgamating diverse criminal proceedings, using a ‘mix-and-match’ approach 
disrupts procedural integrity and makes determinations of whether, overall, a particular 
person has experienced a violation of his or her defence rights complex and difficult to 
ascertain.117 In cases involving cross-border crime, information and evidence may be drawn 
from multiple Member States where procedural rules differ. In certain circumstances, the 
application of mutual recognition in criminal law effectively turns the original rationale of 
mutual recognition, born in the Single Market context, ‘upside down’ by making individuals 
the object rather than the subject of mobility rights.118 A fundamental purpose of mutual 
recognition in the context of the single market is to facilitate rights to free trade and 
movement, which promotes the health of the economy and access to employment, goods and 
services. A core purpose of mutual recognition in the criminal field is to limit freedom and 
restrict mobility in order to enhance accountability for cross-border crime. Essentially, ‘the 
basic point of difference’ between the single market and criminal law is that the single 
market ‘is interested in the distribution of well-being’ whereas ‘the business of criminal law 
is meting out suffering.’119  
 
In addition to the having deleterious effects for particular persons, egregious violations of 
defence rights or simply variance in their scope and application erodes mutual trust between 
Member States and undercuts the functioning of the EU. Mutual trust among Member 
States is necessary for mutual recognition to function smoothly, particularly in the area of 
criminal law. The reality that diversity among systems undermines trust is demonstrated in 
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the series of cases where the legality of the EAW was at issue.120 Courts in Poland, Cyprus, 
Germany and Italy grappled with determining whether the European Framework Decision 
on the EAW conflicted with constitutionally entrenched procedural protections that apply 
in the context of extradition.121 In Germany, the majority of the Federal Constitutional 
Court found that the German legislature was to blame for not making adequate use of the 
margin of appreciation to transpose the EAW in a way that reconciles with the German 
Constitution.122 Courts in Cyprus and Poland ordered amendments to their respective 
constitutions to accommodate the EAW.  
 
The CJEU has upheld the legality of the EAW and confirmed that Member States are ‘in 
principle obliged to act on an EAW’, yet the application of mutual recognition in the field of 
criminal law without uniform and adequate defence rights remains a contentious issue.123 In 
Advocaten voor de Werld VAW, a reference for a preliminary ruling by the Arbitragehof in 
Belgium, the claimant alleged that Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision on the EAW was 
contrary to the principle of legality because it listed vague categories of ‘undesirable 
conduct’, rather than the particular legal definitions of offences, for which Member States 
could execute an EAW, irrespective of whether the particular offence for which the EAW 
was issued existed in their domestic law. 124 The CJEU found that Article 2(2) of the 
Framework Decision did not conflict with the principle of legality because it ‘does not seek 
to harmonize the criminal offences’ or their penalties. The offences ‘continue to be matters 
determined by the law of the issuing Member State’ which must ‘respect fundamental rights 
and fundamental legal principles’ enshrined in EU law.125 This conclusion did not fully 
tackle the root of the claimant’s argument or acknowledge the issue of variance in the 
extent to which and the ways in which Member States exercise respect for defence rights.  
 
More recently, in the case of Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, a preliminary ruling from 
the Tribunal Constitucional (Spain), the CJEU found that a controversial provision of the 
EAW Framework Decision relating to the grounds for the non-execution of an EAW is 
compatible with the defence rights set out in the Charter. The request concerned the 
execution of an EAW issued against Mr. Melloni by Italian authorities for the purpose of 
executing a custodial sentence rendered by judgment in absentia – where he did not appear 
for trial.126  The Spanish court sought guidance on the interpretation and validity of Article 
4a(1) of the EAW Framework Decision, which sets out situations where a Member State 
may refuse to execute an EAW in context of decisions rendered in absentia.127 Citing its case 
law as well as the case law of the ECtHR, the CJEU found that the provision is compatible 
with the defence rights guaranteed by the Charter.128 Specifically, while the ‘right of the 
accused to appear in person at his trial is an essential component of the right to affair trial, 
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that right is not absolute’ - an ‘accused may waiver that right of his own free will’ under 
certain conditions.129 If an accused is ‘informed of the date and place of the trial or was 
defended by a legal counsellor to whom he had given a mandate to do so’, his or her absence 
at trial does not constitute a violation of the right to a fair trial.130 Against this backdrop, 
the CJEU found the EAW Framework Decision sufficiently lays down the situations in 
which persons named on an EAW can be deemed to have waived the ‘right to be present at 
trial’ and respects contemporary human rights standards.131  
 
Defence rights are on the EU agenda and increasing in strength across Europe. With a view 
to fostering cooperation among Member States in efforts to curb serious cross border 
crimes, a roadmap for strengthening the procedural rights of suspected and accused persons 
in criminal proceedings was implemented.132 This roadmap provides a step-by-step 
approach for ensuring respect for ECHR standards and their uniform application across 
Member States. The first step, Measure A, calls for the adoption of a directive on 
translation and interpretation in criminal proceedings whereby suspects or defendants who 
do not speak the language used in criminal proceedings or have hearing or speech 
impairments can understand what is happening and make himself or herself understood.133 
The second step, Measure B, focuses on the right accused to information on defence rights 
(the letter of rights) and information about the nature and cause of an accusation against 
him or her.134 The third step, Measure C, calls for an act to ensure the effective 
implementation of the right to legal advice and the right to legal aid ‘to ensure full equality 
of access to the aforementioned right to legal advice’.135 Measure D calls for mechanisms to 
ensure access to communication with relatives, employers and consular authorities, and 
special safeguards for vulnerable persons. The roadmap was ultimately incorporated into 
the Stockholm Program (2010 – 2014) and adopted by the European Council on 10/11 
December 2009, as a five-year framework work plan for EU action from 2010 – 2014.136  
 
Directives on Measures A and B of the roadmap have been adopted. Exercising competence 
under Article 82(2) of the TFEU, the EU Parliament and Council adopted Measure A of the 
roadmap by implementing the Directive on the rights to interpretation and translation in 
criminal proceedings in September 2010.137 Measure B has also been adopted through the 
implementation of the Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings in 
March 2012.138 This EU law ensures that all persons subject to criminal proceedings in any 
Member State receive a ‘Letter of Rights’ which lists the basic defence rights available 
during criminal proceedings in a language that the person understands.139 The Letter of 
Rights contains practical details on rights such as the right to remain silent, to a lawyer, to 
be informed of the charge, to interpretation and translation in any language for those who 
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do not understand the language of the proceedings, to be brought promptly before a court 
following arrest, and to inform someone else about the arrest or detention. This will help 
‘safeguard against miscarriages of justice,’ facilitate the mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions and improve police and judicial cooperation in the area of criminal law.140  
 
Another millstone for defence rights in the EU is within reach. The Commission put 
forward a Draft Directive to pave the way for the adoption of the right to legal counsel 
(Measure C – Part 1 - without legal aid) and the right to communicate upon arrest 
(Measure D). The Council of the EU adopted a problematic approach to the Draft Directive 
and amendments that diluted the right to legal counsel as well as the remedies available for 
persons who establish a violation.141 Subsequently, the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs Committee (LIBE) of the European Parliament adopted an approach that called for 
stronger protection of defence rights. After nine trilogue meetings - institutionalized 
informal meetings containing representatives of the Council, European Parliament, and 
Commission to facilitate inter-institutional compromise – an agreement was reached in the 
form of a compromise text for the Draft Directive. The full House of the European 
Parliament has accepted the compromise text142 and the Permanent Representatives 
Committee of the Council (Coreper) has endorsed it.143  To enter into force as EU law, the 
Council must formally approve the compromise text.  
 
The Draft Directive is a breakthrough in achieving effective and practical EU-wide defence 
right. In many ways, the Draft Directive concretises standards set by the ECtHR. Notably, 
the compromise text explicitly addresses a common situation where authorities in Member 
States interrogate persons as ‘witnesses’, not as formal ‘suspects’, in order to avoid the 
application of the right of access to a lawyer.144 This affirms the decision of the ECtHR in 
the case of Brusco v. France, which establishes that all persons whether de facto suspects or 
accused persons are entitled to the procedural rights guaranteed under Article 6 of the 
ECHR.145 In the initial approach and amendments to the Draft Directive by the Council, 
this explicit extension of procedural protections to de facto suspects was absent. Similarly, 
unlike in the initial approach of the Council, the compromise text mandates that persons 
subject to an EAW have a right of access to a lawyer in both the issuing Member State and 
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the executing Member. This right to ‘dual representation’ is necessary for the proper 
functioning of the EAW as an institution.146  
 
With respect to remedies, the compromise text of the Draft Directive affirms the decision of 
the ECtHR in the case of Salduz v. Turkey, which establishes that statements or evidence 
made by a suspect ‘obtained in breach of his right to a lawyer’ cannot form the basis of a 
conviction at trial.147 In Salduz that ECtHR also found that the absence of a lawyer for 
persons in police custody irretrievably affects defence rights148 – ‘neither assistance 
provided subsequently by a lawyer nor the adversarial nature of the ensuing proceedings’ 
cures such a defect.149 The compromise text reflects this view that suspects or accused 
persons must receive early access to a lawyer, without delay, before police investigations or 
a deprivation of liberty.150 A problematic aspect of the initial amendments of the Council 
was the creation of a concept of an ‘official interview’ to narrow the range of situations 
where a person may qualify for the right of access to a lawyer.151 This concept effectively 
enables authorities in Member States to question a suspect or accused persons in the 
absence of a lawyer simply by calling the interrogation an unofficial interview. In the 
absence of a broad and clear definition of ‘official interview’, such a concept is inconsistent 
with Salduz.152 Considering the initial purpose of the Draft Directive was to expand the 
right of access to a lawyer in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings, derogations from 
the standards set by the case law of the ECtHR would be alarming. 
 
The compromise text also defines the role of defence lawyers in a way that brings EU law 
up to par with standards set by the ECtHR. In the case of Dayanan v. Turkey, the ECtHR 
establishes that a defence lawyer must be present and able to participate fully during pre-
trial interrogations: ‘the accused be able to obtain the whole range of services specifically 
associated with legal assistance’, including a ‘discussion of the case, organization of the 
defence, collection of evidence and preparation for questioning’. 153 The compromise text 
buttresses this requirement by explicitly stipulating that the right of access to a lawyer 
must entail a right for suspects or accused persons ‘to meet in private and to communicate 
with the lawyer representing them’154 and ‘a right for their lawyer to be present and 
participate effectively when questioned’.155     
 
Civil society organizations view aspects of the compromise text as ‘a real success’, yet 
highlight shortcomings and gaps that persist in the legal framework for defence rights at 
the EU level.156 The most significant concern is the gap with respect to the right to legal 
aid. The compromise text of the Draft Directive largely ignores the reality that the 
implementation of a right to access a lawyer is not feasible without simultaneous rights to 
access legal aid for persons who do not have the resources to afford a lawyer. This gap will 
permit systemic violations of defence rights to continue. Legal aid is ‘the Achilles’ heel’ of 
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several criminal justice systems in the EU – ‘the right to legal aid is not reliably guaranteed 
in many Member States and it definitely does not ensure effective access to the right to 
legal advice as demanded in the Road Map’.157 
 
A primary challenge to procedural justice in the EU is that defence lawyers receive poor 
rates of pay and police or courts appoint lawyers without adequate experience in criminal 
law.158 Remuneration for defence lawyers who work on legal aid mandates varies widely 
within the EU and the expenditure of Member States on legal aid suggests that compliance 
with the right to legal counsel set out in the Draft Directive will be an issue.159 Moreover, 
low pay rates and fixed fee systems - which are typical characteristics of legal aid systems in 
the EU - have deleterious effects on the quality of legal services. A fixed and inadequate 
legal aid fee system effectively forces lawyers to allocate less time to client contact and case 
preparation.160 Lawyers may accept plea bargains to avoid lengthy trials or ‘cherry pick’ less 
complex and more profitable cases.161 Such outcomes undermine the concept of equality 
before the law.  
 
Another concern is variation in the timeliness of the appointment of legal aid across 
Member States. Germany, for example, provides a system of ‘mandatory defence’ for 
suspects and accused persons typically available only at the trial stage of criminal 
proceedings.162 No legal aid is available to facilitate access to legal counsel at the earlier 
stages, such as questioning, evidence gathering or a deprivation of liberty prior to a formal 
arrest warrant. In Poland, through a lengthy process, judges appoint legal aid lawyers for 
persons who are not able to pay for legal services.163 Such processes may contribute to 
violations of the standard set by the ECtHR in Salduz, which requires that suspects receive 
access to a lawyer from the first interrogation by police.164  
 
The ECHR establishes that persons must have a right to legal aid in situations that satisfy 
the ‘means test’ (he or she is not able to pay for legal counsel) and the ‘merits test’ (the 
interest of justice require that the person receives legal counsel).165 Although Member Stats 
may choose different tools for the implementation of the means and merit test, Member 
States must adopt an approach that ensures decisions of whether a person qualifies for legal 
aid is not arbitrary. Currently, according to the ECBA ‘only a bare majority of EU Member 
                                                 
157 ‘ECBA Touchstones – Minimum Standards for the Right to Legal Aid (Measure C part 1)’ (European 
Criminal Bar Assoication, 25 June 2013) 
<http://www.ecba.org/extdocserv/projects/legalaid/20130625_ECBATouchstonesLegalAid.pdf> accessed 
17 December 2013. 
158 For an analysis of the UK, Germany and Hungary see Ed Cape (n 91), 4, 6, and 9. 
159 Council of Europe, ‘Report of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) European 
Judicial Systems’ [2010] 34: ‘A 23% average increase in four years can be underlined in Europe [between 
2004 and 2008]. There are, however, major gaps between states or entities. Some states, previously very 
active in financing access to justice, have sustained such major efforts (Belgium, Iceland, Ireland). Other states 
having just recently implemented legal aid systems still hold, perhaps modest but often key, commitments and 
should be encouraged to follow such path (Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania). Some states or entities 
seem no longer able to uphold the level within their systems that are (and remain) the more generous of all 
and are forced to cut budgets (UK-England and Wales, UK-Scotland, Norway, UK-Northern Ireland). 
Likewise, important reductions in legal aid budgets are recorded in Hungary and Slovakia.’  
160 Vicky Kemp, ‘Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services’ (2010) Legal Services 
Research Centre 114 – 115 <http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/2010/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> accessed 17 December 2013. 
161 ibid 116.  
162 ECBA, ‘Legal Aid Touchstones’ (n 157). 
163 ibid. 
164 Salduz v Turkey (n 105) para 55. 
165 ECHR art 6(3)(c).  
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States have a legal aid merits test, and there is a considerable variation as to the content and 
meaning of the means tests.’166  
 
Concretising minimum standards for legal aid at the EU level is essential to ensure EU 
citizens receive effective defence rights. In the absence of such standards, the right to legal 
assistance effectively remains illusory. Although a complete harmonization of legal aid rules 
would likely be extremely complex and politically challenging, certain minimum standards 
are achievable and necessary. Of particular importance and within the realm of political 
possibility are minimum standards with respect to the quality of legal aid services, the 
timeliness of an appointment of legal aid, and the prevention of arbitrariness in establishing 
eligibility for legal aid.  
 
Directives that reinforce defence rights echo the EU policy objective of creating an area of 
freedom, security and justice, set out in the TEU. 167 Article 2 of the TEU makes the 
intrinsic link between freedom, security and justice and the free movement of persons 
explicit and highlights that the fight against crime should not be at the expense of the free 
movement of persons. For that freedom to be exercised, EU citizens must be able to rely on 
the criminal justice systems of all Member States. Similarly, the smooth functioning of 
cooperation in the area of criminal law to curb cross-border crime requires that authorities 
in Member States trust that the criminal justice systems of other Member States treat all 
persons fairly, in accordance with contemporary human rights standards. Common 
minimum rules of criminal procedure on the right of access to legal counsel and legal aid at 
the EU level has potential to increase both respect for defence rights and confidence in the 
criminal justice systems of Member States across Europe. This will, in turn, foster a climate 
of mutual trust and enhance efficient judicial cooperation. Legal aid in particular has broad 
benefits for the functioning of a criminal justice systems as meaningful legal assistance may 
‘reduce the length of time suspects are held in police stations and detention centres’ as well 
as the ‘prison population, wrongful convictions, prison overcrowding and congestion in 
courts’.168  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Variance in Member State compliance with the ECHR reveals a clear need to enhance the 
protection of defence rights for all persons subject to criminal proceedings in Europe. In the 
absence of adequate protection, EU citizens will continue to suffer systemic violations of 
their rights. This will, in turn, have deleterious effects on mutual trust among Member 
States, undermine cooperation and disrupt efforts to achieve EU policy objectives. Access to 
effective defence rights in criminal proceedings is necessary to ensure that the EU is an area 
where commitments to freedom, security and justice are genuine.   
 
While the implementation of the Directive on the rights to interpretation and translation in 
criminal proceedings and the Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings 
represent significant steps towards the development of effective defence rights in Europe, 
more robust protection of the right of access to legal counsel is necessary. In particular, the 
right of access to legal counsel will remain insufficient unless EU institutions and Member 
States implement, interpret, and apply directives relating to criminal procedure and defence 
rights in ways that respect contemporary human rights standards set by the ECtHR. 
                                                 
166 ECBA, ‘Legal Aid Touchstones’ (n 157).  
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Moreover, the right to legal counsel is ineffective without an accompanying right to legal 
aid. 
 
In an era of ever-increasing globalization, Member States must ‘resist tendencies to treat 
security, justice and fundamental rights in isolation’.169 Member States must adopt a 
‘coherent approach’ to criminal justice that recognizes security and justice ‘go hand in hand’ 
and effectively balances the need to combat transnational crime and the need to respect 
fundamental rights.170 The development of EU mechanisms to facilitate cooperation in 
criminal investigations and prosecutions requires the development of mechanisms that 
ensure defence rights are effective and practical.   
                                                 
169 Commission, ‘Delivering an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Europe’s Citizens Action Plan 
Implementing the Stockholm Programme’ COM (2010) 171 final 2-3.  
170 ibid 3. 
